A Miser’s Rule of Reason: Student Athlete Compensation and the \u3ci\u3eAlston\u3c/i\u3e Antitrust Case by Hovenkamp, Herbert J.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
7-6-2021 
A Miser’s Rule of Reason: Student Athlete Compensation and the 
Alston Antitrust Case 
Herbert J. Hovenkamp 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Courts Commons, Education Law Commons, 
Industrial Organization Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Labor Economics Commons, 
Law and Economics Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States 
Commons 
Repository Citation 
Hovenkamp, Herbert J., "A Miser’s Rule of Reason: Student Athlete Compensation and the Alston Antitrust 
Case" (2021). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 2533. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2533 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
 
 1 
A Miser’s Rule of Reason: Student Athlete Compensation and 
the Alston Antitrust Case 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
Introduction 
The Supreme Court’s decision in NCAA v. Alston is one of the 
most significant antitrust rule of reason cases in history – significant 
both because of what it does and what it does not do.  The Supreme 
Court unanimously agreed with the lower courts that certain 
restrictions imposed on member schools limiting compensation to 
student athletes violated §1 of the Sherman Act.1  The plaintiffs were 
football and basket players subjected to these limitations. 
 The lower courts had struck down specific NCAA rules that 
limited collateral, education-related benefits that student athletes could 
receive, including such things as graduate or vocational school 
scholarships.2  They declined to condemn regulations that the NCAA, 
an organization of 1100 member schools, applied to direct scholarships 
and other aid related to athletic performance.  Nor did they pass 
judgment on any issue regarding player compensation more generally, 
such as whether NCAA member schools could individually pay 
students any salary they wished.  Both the NCAA and the students 
appealed.  The NCAA argued that the district court overreached by 
weakening the NCAA’s restraints on education-related athlete 
compensation.  The student athletes, by contrast, said that the court 
should have enjoined all of the challenged compensation limits, 
 
*James G. Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pennsylvania Carey Law 
School and the Wharton School. 
1 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2021 WL 
2519036 (2021).  Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion, which was 
unanimous.  Justice Kavanaugh wrote a concurring opinion. 
2 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust 
Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 
2020). 
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including those not related to education, and including restriction on 
the size of athletic scholarship and cash awards. 
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs that the restrictions 
imposed “significant anticompetitive effects” by permitting the NCAA 
to use its monopsony power to “cap artificially the compensation 
offered to recruits.”  It found that in the absence of these restrictions, 
compensation would have been higher.3 
Under the rule of reason, once these anticompetitive effects had 
been proven the burden shifted to the defendants to show a 
justification.  If they succeeded the plaintiffs could still prevail by 
showing that the same justification could have been achieved through 
a less restrictive alternative.4 
  The district court also rejected many of the NCAA’s proffered 
justifications.  One of them, that the restrictions increased output, was 
not pursued to the Supreme Court.5  Another was that the rules were 
designed to preserve amateurism in collegiate sports, and that this was 
a benefit that accrued  to consumers rather than to the student athletes 
themselves.6  The district court had responded that the concept of 
amateurism was never very well defined.7  Further, the link between 
amateurism and consumer demand was never established.8  It did 
suggest, however, that a rule against unlimited compensation might 
have operated to distinguish collegiate from professional athletics and 
thus “help sustain consumer demand for college athletics.”9 
The students also attempted to show less restrictive alternatives 
to those rules for which the court had found justifications, and the court 
 
3 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2152. 
4 See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 
1505 (4th ed. 2017). 
5 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2152.  
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 2152-53. 
9 Id. at 2153 (citing the district court, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1083). 
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concluded that they had partially done so.  The less restrictive 
alternative was to permit a cap provided that it be not less than the cost 
of attendance.10  It declined to enjoin the rules limiting compensation 
to the full cost of an education and that restricted benefits unrelated to 
their education.  However, it found that the caps limiting scholarships 
for graduate or vocational school, payments for academic tutoring, or 
post eligibility internships were unlawful because these could not be 
confused with the compensation given to professional athletes.11  As 
the Supreme Court subsequently observed: 
Nothing in the [lower court’s] order precluded the NCAA from 
continuing to fix compensation and benefits unrelated to 
education; limits on athletic scholarships, for example, 
remained untouched. The court enjoined the NCAA only from 
limiting education-related compensation or benefits that 
conferences and schools may provide to student-athletes 
playing Division I football and basketball. The court’s 
injunction further specified that the NCAA could continue to 
limit cash awards for academic achievement—but only so long 
as those limits are no lower than the cash awards allowed for 
athletic achievement (currently $5,980 annually).12 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the entire decree.  The NCAA, but 
not the students, petitioned the Supreme Court with respect to those 
parts of the decree that were adverse to it. As a result, the Court’s 
decision addressed only the NCAA’s disputes with the lower courts.  
With respect to those, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s 
decree in all respects. 
 The Supreme Court posed the question as whether the NCAA 
was seeking “immunity from the normal operation of the antitrust laws 
. . . .”13  It opened with a colorful history of intercollegiate sports, 
 
10 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2153.  See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 2159. 
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including the highly disorganized and questionable mechanisms that 
the schools used to recruit athletes and compensate them for play.14  
Much of the debate prior to this decision involved the student athletes’ 
status as “amateurs,” and the various rules intended to permit schools 
to compensate athletes for the cost of tuition, room and board, and 
some other elements of school attendance, but not more.  Over the 
years these rules had evolved, permitting some additional 
compensation but always significantly limited to below market levels, 
at least for superstar athletes. The Court also observed that 
intercollegiate sports, but particularly football and basketball, had 
evolved into multibillion dollar enterprises, paying very high salaries 
to principal employees such as athletic directors and head coaches.15 
 The Supreme Court noted that the district court had been 
compelled to apply the rule of reason, as the Supreme Court’s own 
1984 Oklahoma Board of Regents decision had instructed.16  On the 
question of market power, it then concluded that the NCAA enjoys 
“near complete dominance” and “monopsony power” in a relevant 
market defined as “athletic services in men’s and women’s Division I 
basketball and FBS (Football Bowl Subdivision) football.  This was 
essentially “the relevant market for elite college football and 
basketball.”17 
 The Supreme Court observed that neither side challenged the 
district court’s market definition or the proposition that the NCAA 
enjoys monopsony power in the labor market in question.  Nor did the 
NCAA dispute the fact of price fixing, or that the restrictions operated 
so as to decrease student compensation in fact.18  Nor did they dispute 
that these limitations tended to depress both the quantity and quality 
 
14 Id. at 2148-51. 
15 Id. 
16 Nat’l Collegiate Atheltic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of U. of Oklahoma, 468 
U.S. 85, 104 (1984). 
17 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2152 (citing the district court, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 
1067). 
18 Id. at 2154-55. 
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of participation by student athletes.19  As a result, the soundness of the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case was largely assumed. 
Further, the court held suppression of competition on the 
buying side (student athlete) of the relevant market was all the 
competitive harm that was necessary; that is, the plaintiffs did not need 
additionally show harm to the selling side of the market.20  The 
importance of this distinction is that cognizable monopsony harm to 
the buy side of the market is sufficient.  It is not merely derivative of 
harm on the selling, or monopoly side of the market. This has always 
been clear in the economic theory of monopsony,21 and most have 
thought that it was clear in antitrust law as well.22 
The idea that harm to the buy side of the market is 
independently challengeable under the antitrust laws makes a 
difference when an entity purchases in a restrained market but resells 
in a competitive market.  In such a case there would be competitive  
harm only on the buy side of the market.  Because §1 of the Sherman 
Act23 does not reference either buyers or sellers, it thus also seems 
clear that §2 applies equally24 to buy side monopoly.  Section 7 of the 
Clayton25 is similar, applying equally to both sell-side and buy-side 
anticompetitive effects.  By contrast, §3 of the Clayton Act, which 
covers exclusive dealing and tying, explicitly covers only sellers.26 
 
19 Id. at 2154 (citing 12 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 2011b (4th ed. 2019). 
20 Id. (citing 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW, ¶ 352c (2014), 12 id., ¶ 2011a). 
21 See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and 
Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 297 (1991); and ROGER D. BLAIR & 
JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed., 2010). 
22 See, e.g., 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW, ¶ 575 (5th ed. 2020); 4A id., ¶¶ 980-982 (4th ed. 2016). 
23 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
24 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
25 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
26 15 U.S.C. § 14 (“It shall be unlawful . . . to lease or make a sale . . . .”). 
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The student athletes did not dispute that it would be permissible 
for the NCAA to justify labor market restraints by pointing to 
offsetting benefits on the consumer side of the market.  The Court 
noted that some amici had argued that such “out of market” offsets 
would be impermissible, but the parties themselves did not pursue it 
and neither did the Court.27  In antitrust generally, that question is 
generally settled in the negative, and certainly for naked restraints. 
In the 1984 Oklahoma Board of Regents decision the Supreme 
Court concluded that the rule of reason should apply to restraints 
established by agreement among NCAA members because 
cooperation among teams was necessary in order to create the product 
in question at all.28  The NCAA in the present case argued that this 
legal rule supported its argument that there should be truncated 
deferential review favoring the restrictions in this case.29  The Court 
dismissed that argument.  Neither did it conclude, however, that this 
was a per se unlawful or a per se lawful restraint.  While some 
restraints could be evaluated “in the twinkling of an eye,”30 that was 
true only for “restraints at opposite ends of the competitive spectrum,” 
not for those in the “great in-between.”31  Among the former would be 
restraints in which market power was clearly lacking.32  In this case, 
however, NCAA did not dispute the fact of its market power.33  As a 
result, the Court concluded, a “quick look” was not appropriate.34 
 
27 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2155 (“[W]e express no views on [these matters]”). 
28 Bd. of Regents of U. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. at 100-01 (1984) (some 
“horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be 
available at all”). 
29 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2155 (citing 13 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 2100c). 
30 Id. (quoting Phillip Areeda, The “Rule of Reason” in Antitrust Analysis: 
General Issues 37-38 (Fed. Jud. Ctr., June 1981)). 
31 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2155. 
32 Id. at 2156 (citing Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 
792 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1986); and 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 1507a (4th ed. 2017)). 
33 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2156-57. 
34 On the “quick look,” see discussion infra, text at notes 89-96. 
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The Court also observed that the 1984 decision had included a 
lengthy discussion of “amateurism.”  Here, however, it found the 
concern to be relatively unimportant, except as a possible way of 
distinguishing the audience for collegiate athletics from that for 
professional athletics.35 
Then, getting to the rule of reason itself, the Court noted its 
own previous references to a “three-step, burden-shifting framework” 
for identifying anticompetitive restraints.36  However, these three steps 
“do not present a rote checklist,” but must be used flexibility, proving 
a rule that is “meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, 
and logic of a restraint.”37  Here, the district court had required “the 
student-athletes to show that ‘the challenged restraints produce 
significant anticompetitive effects in the relevant market.”38  The 
Court noted that this was “no slight burden,” and that “courts have 
disposed of nearly all rule of reason cases in the last 45 years on that 
ground.”39  But this case was different: 
. . . based on a voluminous record, the district court held that 
the student-athletes had shown the NCAA enjoys the power to 
set wages in the market for student-athletes’ labor—and that 
the NCAA has exercised that power in ways that have 
produced significant anticompetitive effects. Perhaps even 
more notably, the NCAA “did not meaningfully dispute” this 
conclusion.40 
The second step the District Court followed was to determine 
whether “the NCAA could muster a procompetitive rationale for its 
 
35 Amateurism is discussed further infra, text at notes 100-09. 
36 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2160 (citing Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 
1174, 2284 (2018). 
37 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2160 (citing California Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 
U.S. 756, 781 (1999) and 7 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, note 32, ¶1507a, 
which it described as offering a “slightly different ‘decisional model’ using 
sequential questions”). 
38 Citing the district court, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1067. 
39 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2161.  On the importance of this, see discussion infra, 
text at note 60. 
40 Id. (citing the district court, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1067). 
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restraints.”41 Here, the NCAA claimed error in that the district court 
looked at the restraints collectively in order to determine competitive 
harm, but individually in order to assess offsetting benefits.  This 
“mismatch,” the defendants argued, required the defendant to prove 
that each individual rule that was challenged was the least restrictive 
means of achieving the procompetitive purpose of differentiating 
college sports and preserving demand for them.”42 
 
 Here, the court agreed with the NCAA’s premise “that antitrust 
law does not require businesses to use anything like the least restrictive 
means of achieving legitimate business purposes.”  Court should not 
be second guessing “degrees of reasonable necessity,” because 
“skilled lawyers” will “have little difficulty imagining possible less 
restrictive alternatives to most joint arrangements.”43  It later warned 
that courts should give “wide berth to business judgments before 
finding liability.”  The Court also cautioned against rules that attempt 
to micro-manage the details of business judgments.  “To know that the 
Sherman Act prohibits only unreasonable restraint of trade is thus to 
know that attempts to ‘[m]ete[r] small deviations is not an appropriate 
antitrust function.44 
 
 The Court then agreed with the district court that the NCAA’s 
proffered defenses failed to “have any direct connection to consumer 
demand.”45  The Court then qualified: 
 
To be sure, there is a wrinkle here. While finding the NCAA 
had failed to establish that its rules collectively sustain 
consumer demand, the court did find that “some” of those rules 
“may” have procompetitive effects “to the extent” they prohibit 
compensation “unrelated to education, akin to salaries seen in 
professional sports leagues.” The court then proceeded to what 
corresponds to the third step of the American Express 
 
41 Id. (citing 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1070). 
42 Id. at 2161. 
43 Id. (citing 11 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW, ¶ 1913b (2018) and, for a slightly different proposition, 7 id., ¶ 1505b). 
44 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2161 (quoting Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust 
Balancing, 12 N.Y.U. L. & BUS. 369, 377 (2016)). 
45 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2162 (citing the district court, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 
1070). 
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framework, where it required the student-athletes “to show that 
there are substantially less restrictive alternative rules that 
would achieve the same procompetitive effect as the 
challenged set of rules.” And there, of course, the district court 
held that the student-athletes partially succeeded—they were 
able to show that the NCAA could achieve the procompetitive 
benefits it had established with substantially less restrictive 




Of course, deficiencies in the NCAA’s proof of procompetitive 
benefits at the second step influenced the analysis at the third. 
But that is only because, however framed and at whichever 
step, anticompetitive restraints of trade may wind up flunking 
the rule of reason to the extent the evidence shows that 
substantially less restrictive means exist to achieve any proven 
procompetitive benefits . . . . “To be sure, these two questions 
can be collapsed into one,” since a “legitimate objective that is 
not promoted by the challenged restraint can be equally served 
by simply abandoning the restraint, which is surely a less 
restrictive alternative”.47 
 
 Effectively, this meant that the district court had correctly 
found, not that the rules were the least restrictive means of preserving 
consumer demand, but rather that the restraints were “patently and 
inexplicably stricter than is necessary” to achieve the declared 
procompetitive benefits.48 
 




46 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2162 (citing the district court, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1082-
83, 1004). 
47 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2162 (quoting 7 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, note 
32, ¶1505). 
48 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2162 (quoting district court, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1104). 
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The Rule of Reason: One Step or Three? 
 In its 1984 Board of Regents decision the Supreme Court held 
that the rule of reason should be applied to a joint venture if the product 
could not be produced at all without collaborative activity.49  The 
Alston Court did not overrule that formulation.  At one point it noted, 
however, that the fact that “some restraints are necessary to create or 
maintain a league sport” does not mean all “aspects of elaborate 
interleague cooperation are.”50 
 The Court’s 1984 conclusion about the scope of the rule of 
reason was stated more broadly than it needed to be to address the case 
at hand.  The result has been to make economic evaluation of practices 
in joint ventures excessively cumbersome and costly – a result that 
reaches far beyond the NCAA sports cases.51 
Some practices within the NCAA need to be coordinated in 
order to make the product available, while others do not.  For example, 
suppose the NCAA promulgated a rule fixing the price of hot dogs sold 
in stadiums hosting NCAA events.  Is there any reason to subject that 
practice to all of the cost that accompanies rule of reason treatment, 
including an assessment of market power, simply because other 
practices that do require cooperation must be treated more 
 
49 Bd. of Regents of U. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. at 100-01 (1984) (some 
“horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be 
available at all”). 
50 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2156 (quoting Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football 
League, 560 U.S. 183, 199 n. 7 (2010). 
51 E.g., In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008) (network coordination); Martin v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 697 F. 
Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (collaborative rules for dog shows).  See also Nw. 
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing, Co., 472 U.S. 284, 
295 (1985) (citing this language in concluding that the activities of a 
cooperative buying association should be addressed under the rule of reason).  
Cf. United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 326 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding 
that the language did not apply to a naked boycott agreement); Dagher v. 
Saudi Refin., Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 1 
(2006) (did not apply to a production joint venture). 
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deferentially?  We must remember that the rule of reason is a costly 
tool.  It is worth its price only if its use produces sufficiently greater 
accuracy. 
The well established antitrust distinction between “naked” and 
“ancillary” restraints would actually work quite well for this purpose.  
An ancillary restraint is one that is reasonably necessary for the 
functioning of the venture and achievement of its purpose.  Further, its 
profitability does not depend on the exercise of market power.  To be 
sure, the NCAA presents some unusual complexities because of its 
nonprofit status and its role in the education process as well as its 
responsibility in loco parentis for student growth and discipline.  But 
these are largely addressed “jurisdictionally,” by considering whether 
the challenged restraint is commercial in character and thus within the 
Sherman Act’s limitations to commerce.52 
 The Alston Court also observed that prior courts had adopted a 
three-step burden-shifting framework for analyzing restraints under 
the rule of reason.53  This decision making approach is a significant 
improvement over Justice Brandeis’ original statement of the rule of 
reason in the Chicago Board of Trade case.  Looking at an agreement 
that both restrained prices and promised to make a market perform 
better, Justice Brandeis queried whether the restraint “merely 
regulated and perhaps thereby promotes competition,” or whether it 
might “suppress or even destroy competition.”54 To answer that 
question, he concluded, the court would have to consider the history 
of the business and the restraint, the condition of the market before and 
after the restraint was imposed, and its “effect, actual or probable.”55  
 
52 See 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 
260 (5th ed. 2020) (commercial activities generally); Id., ¶ 261 (nonprofit 
organizations); Id., ¶ 262 (noncommercial activities); see discussion infra, 
text at notes 131-39. 
53 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2151 (citing Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284). 
54 Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 
(1918). 
55 Id. 
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In other words, the parties were invited to throw in everything relevant 
to the business and see what sticks.  That formulation led to a rule of 
reason jurisprudence that required enormous records and trials.56 
 Today’s rule of reason takes an approach that is both more 
focused and more transactional, insisting on market power and the 
identification of practices that threatens to reduce market output and 
raise price.57  The burden shifting framework is designed to guide this 
query, placing the burden of proof where it is calculated to produce 
results efficiently in the majority of cases.  The prima facie case must 
initially be made by the plaintiff, who should be able to plead and 
prove a theory of competitive harm and, if necessary, injury.  By 
contrast, because the defendant is the author of the conduct it should 
be in the best position to understand its motives and perceived effects.  
Under this framework the plaintiff has an initial burden of making a 
prima facie showing that the challenged restraint has a “substantial 
anticompetitive effect.”58 At that point the burden shifts to the 
defendant to prove a procompetitive rationale.  If the defendant shows 
one, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff for an opportunity to 
show that the procompetitive rationale could be achieved by less 
anticompetitive means.59 
 In Alston the Supreme Court observed, however, that plaintiffs 
rarely get past the first step.  In fact, 90% of cases litigated in the 
previous 45 years were dismissed because the plaintiff failed at the 
first stage.60 The Court found the present case to be one of the 
 
56 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 5.6 (6th ed. 2020). 
57See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, 
Ch. 15 (4th ed. 2017). 
58 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2160. 
59 Id. (citing 7 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, note 57, ¶ 1507a). 
60 Id. at 2160-61 (citing Brief for 65 Professors of Law, Business, Economics, 
and Sports Management as Amici Curiae 21, n. 9, (Nos. 20-512, 20-520), 
2021 WL 943556).  For the empirical work supporting this proposition, see 
Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 
BYU L. Rev. 1265 (1999); Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: an 
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exceptions.61  And, of course, it should have been, given that the 
challenge was to what amounted to a naked cartel. 
The Court did not seek to determine why plaintiffs’ cases fail 
so frequently at the first, or prima facie, stage.  One possibility, of 
course, is that plaintiffs bring a lot of weak cases.  Another one, 
however, is that the plaintiff’s burden created by the courts for the first 
stage is unreasonably harsh.  If that is the case, then some harmful 
restraints escape because of judicial rather than plaintiff error. 
A likely explanation for this is exaggerated confidence that 
markets will usually correct anticompetitive practices, and more 
quicky than the courts can do it.  Today a wealth of observation and 
literature shows that this premise is both theoretically and empirically 
incorrect, but it has had surprising durability in antitrust policy.62  It 
shows up powerfully in federal court tendencies to articulate a three-
part rule of reason, but then to load all of the important requirements 
into the first part – effectively, a one part rule of reason.  That increases 
the plaintiff’s burden while minimizing the defendant’s need to justify 
its restraint. 
This bias shows up mainly in the ways that the courts address 
the first stated step.  As this Court described it, the plaintiff must show 
that “the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive 
effect.”63  Does that mean substantial anticompetitive effect after all 
efficiencies are netted out?  If it does then the requirement effectively 
wipes out the second step of the rule of reason because it rolls harms 
and offsetting efficiencies all into the first step, assigning the burden 
for both to the plaintiff. 
 
Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827 (2009); 
Michael A. Carrier, The Four-Step Rule of Reason, 33 Antitrust 50 (Spring 
2019).  
61 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2161. 
62 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Error Costs (June 16, 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3853282.  
63 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2160 (quoting Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284). 
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The merger statute, §7 of the Clayton Act, uses roughly 
analogous language for assessing mergers – “where . . . the effect . . .  
may be substantially to lessen competition . . . .”64  The statute does 
not contain an efficiency defense, and there has always been some 
dispute about how efficiencies should be considered.65  But the current 
formulation of merger policy expressed in the Merger Guidelines is 
that the government makes out a prima facie case based largely on 
structural evidence, and then the burden shifts to the defendant to 
establish offsetting efficiencies.66 
 Most rule of reason cases do not involve naked or nearly naked 
cartels. They are concerned with production or research joint ventures, 
professional association rules, standard setting, or other types of 
agreements whose effects are more ambiguous.  Alston was the unique 
rule of reason case in which the practice that the Court was confronting 
was in fact very close to a naked cartel.  In any other setting it would 
have been governed by the per se rule but for an idiosyncratic history 
that compelled the rule of reason. 
 Further, the Court often incorporates an anti-enforcement bias 
that prevents it from seeing competitive harm even when it is right in 
front of them.  A good example is the American Express case, where 
the Court held that the plaintiff had not met its initial burden.67  While 
the American Express card offered greater perquisites such as cash 
back, extended warranties, travel miles or other feature than competing 
cards, it also charged significantly higher fees to merchants.  The 
merchants were in effect paying for benefits that accrued to the card 
user.  The challenged anti-steering rule forbad merchants from 
informing customers that card fees for use of an American Express 
card were significantly higher than those for use of a competing card 
 
64 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
65 See Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, note 57, ¶¶ 970-973. 
66 See id., ¶ 970f. 
67 Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
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such as Visa or MasterCard.  It also forbad them from offering 
customers a discount for switching to a different card.68 
 Had the Court applied a more focused, transaction-specific 
analysis to these rules it would have had little trouble seeing 
competitive harm. Suppose that the merchant fee for using an 
American Express card on a large purchase was $15, while the fee for 
accepting a Visa card was $10.  That difference created $5 worth of 
bargaining room.  In that case the merchant might have offered the 
customer a $3 discount for using a different card.  That bargain, had it 
occurred, would have benefitted the customer by $3 less foregone 
AmEx perquisites.  It would have benefitted the merchant by $2.  The 
customer would accept the offer only if she valued the discount by 
more than the foregone perquisites, so the deal would have been a 
Pareto improvement looking at the two bargaining parties.69  It would 
permit substitution to the Visa card precisely in those circumstances 
where use of the Visa card was efficient. 
 What the Court did not see is that every single instance in 
which the no-steering rule prevented such a transaction actually caused 
harm on both sides of the market – i.e., to both the affected customer 
and the affected merchant.  At that point, no sensible enforcement-
neutral approach to antitrust would have dropped the inquiry.  Indeed, 
the Alston Court expressly characterized the challenged harms 
resulting from NCAA compensation limitations in terms of price and 
output.70  Rather, the AmEx Court should have held that the burden at 
that point shifted to American Express to provide a procompetitive 
justification for its rule. 
 The Court also did a version of this in the California Dental 
case, where it concluded that a dental association’s restrictions on 
advertising that prohibited quality advertising and effectively 
 
68 See Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. CORP. L. 713 (2019). 
69 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis in Antitrust Economics, 101 
B. U. L. Rev. 489, 514 (2021). 
70 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2158. 
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prohibited most forms of price advertising were not sufficiently 
threatening to require the defendant to provide an explanation.71  Once 
again, it is possible that upon further investigation we might discover 
that the potential for abuse is so severe that the rules were justified 
under the circumstances, but the Court effectively cut that inquiry 
short.72 
 If the only time that plaintiffs can successfully proceed through 
the “three-step” rule of reason case is when the challenged restraint 
amounts to little more than naked collusion, then the rule of reason is 
not doing its job and is not really a three-step rule of reason at all.  In 
most rule of reason challenges, including those brought by the 
government, the plaintiff’s prima facie case depends on market 
evidence that supports reasonable inferences of competitive harm.  By 
contrast, when the burden shirts, the defense typically depends on 
evidence that pertains to the defendant’s own conduct and the 
rationales for it.  In terms of decisional quality cases that raise an 
inference of competitive harm will be more accurately resolved at the 
second stage rather than the first one.  This does not mean that trivial 
claims or claims against firms that clearly lack power should go 
forward.  It does suggest, however, that at the first stage the plaintiff 
should bear a smaller burden.  It should be regarded somewhat more 
like the probable cause requirements that judges and magistrates use 
in issuing a search warrant: it should raise reasonable suspicions 
warranting a further inquiry. 
 For example, in American Express the plaintiff had established 
that each instance of enforcement of the anti-steering rule caused 
exclusion of a rival credit card that injured both the affected merchant 
and the affected card holder.  At that point the burden should have 
shifted to AmEx to show that the challenged steering rule (not it overall 
business rule) served a procompetitive purpose and was not simply a 
 
71 California Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
72 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 98-114 
(2018). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3879580
2021 Alston, Antitrust, and College Athletics 17 
 
way for it to get merchants and users of non-AmEx cards to subsidize 
its business by denying them to bargain for the opportunity to use a 
cheaper payment mechanism.  In fact, American Express should have 
been an easy case, given that each instance of enforcement of the anti-
steering rule resulted in harm to both sides of the affected transaction.73 
 While harm to competition entails higher prices and reduced 
output, most cases do not require actual empirical evidence of such 
effects. In the Alston case itself the Court acknowledged that it was 
easy, mainly because the NCAA never disputed that the “restrictions 
in fact decrease the compensation that student athletes receive 
compared to what a competitive market would yield.”74 Further, no 
one questioned that these decreases in compensation also “depress[ed] 
participation by student athletes.”  As a result, both price and output 
were depressed.75 
 In most cases the proof consists in reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from the practices plus our own knowledge of rational 
behavior under the circumstances.  For example, because an AmEx 
card holder and a merchant in the previous illustrations would agree to 
a discount for use of a different card we can infer that, as between the 
two of them prices are lower and output higher as a result of the deal.  
This is not because we have taken an actual empirical measurement of 
increased output or lower prices, but because parties never make 
voluntary agreements unless they expect to benefit.  As a result, the 
conclusion that the no-steering rule tended to raise price and reduce 
output is sufficient, certainly for a prima facie case. 
 In a case such as Actavis the inference of harm is strong as 
well.76  The effect of the pay-for-delay patent settlement is to enable 
the patentee to retain its exclusive right for the duration of the 
 
73 See discussion supra, text at note 68. 
74 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2154. 
75 Id. (citing 12 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW, ¶ 2011b (4th ed. 2019).) 
76 F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013). 
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settlement agreement.  Prices are almost certainly higher than they 
would be in the absence of the settlement agreement.  Otherwise the 
payment for delay would not be worth it.  That still leaves the question 
whether the agreement is justified because the patent could be valid, 
but that question is generally determinable by looking at the size of the 
payment.  A person who owns good title to a property interest will 
typically not be willing to pay hundreds of millions of dollars to 
exclude trespassers.  So a high payment is a strong signal that the 
parties’ expectations are that the patent is invalid.77 
 The Alston Court did not mention causation, although both 
causation and harm were clearly implicit in the conclusion that 
compensation and output were actually suppressed by the challenged 
rules.  A private plaintiff seeking damages would have to show 
causation and be able to quantify its harm,78 while a private plaintiff 
seeking an injunction would have to show “threatened loss or 
damage.”79 
Balancing and the “Quick Look” 
 One goal of the changes in the rule of reason in the time since 
Brandeis has been to avoid or at least limit the need for “balancing” – 
a proposition that the Alston district court agreed with.80  The term 
 
77 See 12 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW  
¶ 2046c (4th ed. 2020). 
78 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation, WASH. UNIV. 
L. REV. (2021) (forthcoming), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3771399.   
79 Id. 
80 See 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1104. See also, id. at 1108, quoting Areeda & 
Hovenkamp, ¶ 1507d: 
 
A better way to view balancing is as a last resort when the 
defendant has offered a procompetitive explanation for a prima 
facie anticompetitive restraint, but no less restrictive alternative has 
been shown . . . . The court must then determine whether the 
anticompetitive effects . . . are sufficiently offset by the proffered 
defense. 
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balancing always sounds pleasing until someone actually has do to it.  
Further, it is always important to remember that in economics most of 
the important values are cardinal – i.e., they need to have values 
attached to them before they are of very much use.  This is not 
invariably true.  For example, the Pareto principle is able to identify 
welfare improvements without balancing because the only time it 
measures welfare at all is when there is nothing to balance.  Unanmity, 
for instance, is a useful indicator of a Pareto-optimal condition.81 
 As soon as the prospect of both gains and losses is present, 
however, the issues become more complex. In the 1960s and 1970s 
Oliver Williamson in economics and Robert H. Bork in law developed 
a welfare tradeoff, or balancing, approach that netted out consumer 
losses from monopoly against productive efficiency gains.82  Bork then 
did antitrust an enormous disservice by naming this the “consumer 
welfare” principle even though one of its most potent effects is to 
approve of antitrust rules that harm consumers.  The confusion has 
plagued antitrust to this day, and almost certainly accounts for much 
of the opposition to the consumer welfare principle.  By contrast, the 
true consumer welfare principle asks only if output is higher, or prices 
lower, as a result of a certain event; it does not try to balance the effects 
of reduced output against claimed offsetting efficiencies.83 
 As soon as an antitrust tribunal is required to balance in any 
situation that is not immediately obvious it is out of its element. 
Competitive losses or harms would have to be quantified.  That would 
require a court to identify the social cost of an exercise of market 
 
81 See Amartya Sen, Liberty, Unanimity and Rights, 43 Economica 217 
(1976); Kenneth Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. 
POL. ECON. 328 (1950). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow’s Theorem: 
Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 IOWA L. REV. 949 (1990). 
82 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: the Welfare 
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968); ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 106 (1978). 
83 See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation, supra note 78. 
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power, and also to put a cardinal value on efficiencies.  No court can 
do these things except in the easiest cases. 
 Beginning with that premise, the three-stage rule of reason 
inquiry was designed in order to limit the circumstances when a court 
needs to engage in balancing.  First one looks at harms alone.  They do 
not have to be quantified in any technical sense but they must be 
determined to be substantial.  Then one looks at claimed benefits.  If 
there are none, then we have something close to the Pareto case – all 
harms and nothing else.  If benefits are proven, then we would be in a 
more difficult situation because harms and benefits would have to be 
quantified.  That is the paradigm that Oliver Williamson contemplated 
in his essay on welfare tradeoff models. 
 The less restrictive alternative is best viewed as a backstop – 
or another opportunity to make balancing unnecessary.  If the 
defendants can achieve most of their objective through an available 
and effective less restrictive alternative then the harm will be either 
eliminated or at least mitigated. 
The Court found that the NCAA was quite correct in its 
argument that antitrust law does not require a firm to employ “anything 
like the least restrictive means of achieving legitimate business 
purposes.”84  Indeed, the use of least restrictive alternatives is much 
narrow than that.  First, the query becomes relevant only when the 
plaintiff has shown conduct that harms competition. At that point the 
burden shifts to the defendant to show a justification and only when 
that burden is met may the plaintiff be permitted to show an available 
less restrictive alternative.  The proffered alternative must be 
realistically available.85  Importantly, however, cardinal balancing can 
be completely avoided in the great majority of cases. 
 
84 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2161. 
85 Id. (quoting 11 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 43, ¶ 1913b at 398 (“‘a 
skilled lawyer’ will ‘have little difficulty imagining possible less restrictive 
alternatives to most joint arrangements.’”). 
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For example, suppose that a joint venture’s aggregation of 
patents or other intellectual property rights has been shown to be 
unreasonably exclusionary. The defendant is able to show that a 
particular acquisition or aggregation is valuable for innovation, but at 
that time the plaintiff might be able to show that a non-exclusive 
license could give the defendant everything it needs to improve its own 
technology, but not the right to exclude.  Further, it is no answer that 
the non-exclusive right would be worth much less to the selling firm.  
The market determines that.  In this case, an order compelling non-
exclusivity would very likely address the competition problem fully.86 
 The more problematic issue respecting less restrictive 
alternatives was the district court’s use of that idea to regulate the size 
of the compensation limit.  Under the order, which the Supreme Court 
was held, the NCAA could limit education-related benefits, but only 
so long as those limits are no lower than the cash awards allowed for 
athletic achievement.”87   This puts the court in a position 
uncomfortably close to that of a price regulator.  For example, in a per 
se case in which defendant’s fixed the price of widgets at $10 each we 
would never say that fixing the price at $9 is a less restrictive 
alternative.  Of course the per rule would not permit such an approach.  
The price fix is unlawful no matter what its size. 
 If the price fix is subject to the rule of reason however – as it 
currently would be under the Supreme Court’s holding that the rule of 
reason applies to all NCAA rules – then just such a possibility might 
arise.  For example, suppose that the NCAA fixed the price of season 
tickets offered by individual teams – something that we would 
ordinarily expect to be covered by the per se rule, but in the case of the 
NCAA.  We would not want to get into the position of says that, pricing 
season tickets at, say, $500 is unlawful, but a less restrictive alternative 
 
86 Cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: the Law of 
Competition and its practice § 12.3 (6th ed. 2020) (acquisition of 
nonexclusive right in order to render merger competitively harmless) 
87 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2153. 
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would be to price them at $400.  That would in fact turn the court into 
a price regulator. 
 In the one significant NCAA price-fixing case that has been 
decided, Law v. NCAA, the Tenth Circuit felt obligated to apply the 
rule of reason.88  It applied what it characterized as a “quick look” to 
an NCAA rule fixing the maximum salaries for secondary basketball 
coaches.  In effect, the rule was deeply suspicious – all the way to the 
anticompetitive end of Justice Gorsuch’s spectrum.89 The court then 
found that there were no offsetting procompetitive benefits.  As a 
result, it held, it was unnecessary to pursue the issue of less restrictive 
alternatives.90 
 The Supreme Court in Alston also declined the NCAA’s 
suggestion that the Court adopt a “quick look,” which the NCAA 
characterized as “abbreviated deferential review” to the compensation 
limitations.91  The principal argument was that “collaboration among 
its member is necessary if they are to offer consumers the benefit of 
intercollegiate athletic competition.”92  The Court did agree that, if 
they apply at all, “quick look” approaches can work in both directions.  
In some cases, they can offer a quick path to condemnation, as the FTC 
requested in the California Dental and Actavis cases, but they can offer 
a quick path to salvation, as the NCAA was seeking in Alston. 
 The Supreme Court has never been enthusiastic about the 
“quick look” doctrine, which calls for an intermediate query that falls 
between the per se rule and the rule of reason.  Prior to Alston it 
discussed the rule three times, but only to reject its use in the particular 
case before it.93  On the other hand, it has permitted forms of truncated 
 
88 Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
89 Id. at 1020. 
90 Id. at 1024, n. 16. 
91 See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2155. 
92 Id. (citing 13 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW, ¶ 2100c (4th ed. 2020)). 
93 F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 159 (2013) (declining to apply 
“quick look”); Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (observing, and 
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analysis that fall somewhere short of the full rule of reason.94  While 
refusing to embrace a quick look, the Alston Court did observe that the 
Oklahoma Board of Regents case did support “abbreviated antitrust 
review.”95  That has always been the best way to think about the issue 
– not as three silos with per se, quick look, and full rule of reason as 
three discrete points along a line.  Rather, methods of analysis lay 
along a “sliding scale” with varying amounts and kinds of evidence 
being necessary depending on the issues and the nature and availability 
of evidence.96  In Alston itself, application of the rule of reason was 
easy, mainly because the NCAA had conceded the central points – 
namely that the restraint had resulted in reduced compensation and 
reduced output.97 
Labor Suppression – the Seen and the Unseen 
 Given that the issue was compensation, the players and the 
teams in Alston existed in a quasi-employer-employee relationship.  As 
a result the decision is an example of the Supreme Court’s relatively 
infrequent incursions into the relationship between labor and the 
antitrust laws.  It was made all the more infrequent by the fact that 
there was no labor union.98 
 
not questioning, that the district court had refused to apply quick look 
doctrine); California Dental Ass'n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) 
(declining to grant FTC's request for “quick look” analysis). 
94 F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (truncated proof 
of anticompetitive effects); F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158-59 
(2013) (truncated proof of both power and effects). 
95 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2157 (citing Bd. of Regents of U. of Oklahoma, 468 
U.S. at 109, n. 39). 
96 See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159 (adopting a “sliding scale” approach, 
quoting ¶1507).  See also Hovenkamp, Rule of Reason, supra note 72 at 
122-123. 
97 See discussion supra note 18-19. 
98 On antitrust and labor laws for unionized labor, see Brown v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (unionized football times); H.A. Artists 
& Assocs. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704 (1981) (line between 
employees and independent contractors).  Other decisions are discussed in 
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Alston is a forceful statement of one aspect of antitrust concern 
for labor.  The Court spoke categorically of labor’s interest in a 
competitive marketplace.  In the process it made clear that labor 
market competition is not in any sense derivative of competition on the 
other (output) side of the market.  A cartel that suppresses wages is 
unlawful whether or not it also raises prices in product markets.  This 
can be especially important when a firm or group of firms wield power 
in the labor market in which they purchase but are competitive in the 
output market where they sell their product. 
 Nevertheless, the fact remains that this is only a small part of 
the antitrust interest in labor market competition.  There is another very 
important sense in which the fortunes of labor are dependent on 
competition in product markets.  Monopoly in product markets reduces 
output.  Further, nearly all of labor, and particularly at lower salary 
levels, is a variable cost.  As a result, reduced output in product markets 
leads directly and often proportionately to reduced demand for labor.  
The negative impact on labor of product market monopoly is almost 
certainly many times higher than the negative impact of labor market 
restraints.99 
“Amateurism” 
 The NCAA has a long tradition of promoting amateurism in 
collegiate athletics.  Alston quoted this passage from the 1984 
Oklahoma Board of Regents decision: 
“The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a 
revered tradition of amateurism in college sports. There can be 
no question but that it needs ample latitude to play that role, or 
that the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education 
 
1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 255-
257 (5th ed. 2020). 
99 See Edgar K. Browning, A Neglected Welfare Cost of Monopoly – and 
Most Other Product Market Distortions, 66 J. PUB. ECON. 127 (1997).  
One of the seminal studies was Leonard W. Weiss, Concentration and 
Labor Earnings, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 96 (1966) 
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adds richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is 
entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.”100 
 
 Notwithstanding that strong statement, in fact the 1984 
decision had relatively little to do with amateurism.  At issue was 
nationwide commercial television contracts for the broadcast of 
NCAA football games. The NCAA had argued for a connection 
between the preservation of amateurism and limitations that served to 
equalize access to broadcasting to preserve competitive balance, but 
the Court disagreed.101  By contrast, Justice White’s dissent in the 1984 
case found a strong link between the NCAA’s interest in preserving 
amateurism and the policy of limiting televised games.  He argued that 
it served to spread revenue more evenly among participating school, 
giving amateur athletes even from less schools a fair change.102 
 
100 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2157 (quoting Okla. Board of Regents, 469 U.S. at 
120. 
101 See Bd. of Regents of U. of Oklahoma, 469 U.S. at 119. 
102 Id. at 124, 135-36 (White, J., dissenting): 
[T]he [television restriction] plan fosters the goal of amateurism by 
spreading revenues among various schools and reducing the 
financial incentives toward professionalism. As the Court observes, 
the NCAA imposes a variety of restrictions perhaps better suited 
than the television plan for the preservation of amateurism. 
Although the NCAA does attempt vigorously to enforce these 
restrictions, the vast potential for abuse suggests that measures, like 
the television plan, designed to limit the rewards of professionalism 
are fully consistent with, and essential to the attainment of, the 
NCAA's objectives. In short, “[t]he restraints upon Oklahoma and 
Georgia and other colleges and universities with excellent football 
programs insure that they confine those programs within the 
principles of amateurism so that intercollegiate athletics 
supplement, rather than inhibit, educational achievement.” The 
collateral consequences of the spreading of regional and national 
appearances among a number of schools are many: the television 
plan, like the ban on compensating student-athletes, may well 
encourage students to choose their schools, at least in part, on the 
basis of educational quality by reducing the perceived economic 
element of the choice. 
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Subsequent lower court decisions did involve athlete 
compensation, however, and they made the role of amateurism more 
prominent.103  The Alston decision stands in contrast to that. Justice 
Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion wrote as if concerns about 
amateurism were no long important at all.104 The majority did not go 
quite that far.  Rather, the Court observed that the NCAA’s own 
conception of amateurism had evolved very considerably since 1984, 
and that it had “dramatically increased the amounts and kind of 
benefits schools may provide to student-athletes.”105  Most of these 
included things like larger scholarships or greater amounts of 
assistance to struggling students.106 Accompanying this, the amount of 
revenue produced by broadcasting of collegiate sports had increased 
many-fold.107 Further, “while the NCAA asks us to defer to its 
conception of amateurism, the district court found that the NCAA had 
not adopted any consistent definition.”  Rather, its definition had 
“shifted markedly over time.”108  The Court did not rule that concerns 
about preserving amateurism are irrelevant to the antitrust analysis, but 
clearly they are now less central. 
 
 The more important question for antitrust policy is whether and 
how these concerns about amateurism fit into Sherman Act analysis 
under the rule of reason.  A strong concern to protect amateurism might 
effectively yield to the NCAA carte blanche to determine the 
appropriate compensation for its student athletes.  The Court clearly 
 
(citations omitted). 
103 See, e.g., O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1059, 
1063-1066 (9th Cir. 2015); Law. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 
1010 (10th Cir. 1998); In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n I-A Walk-On 
Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2005); Adidas 
Am., Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (D. Kan. 
1999). 
104 Alston, 141 S.Ct. at 2167 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
105 Id. at 2158. 
106 Id. 
107 See id., observing that “From 1982 to 1984, CBS paid $16 million per 
year to televise the March Madness Division I men’s basketball 
tournament. In 2016, those annual television rights brought in closer to $1.1 
billion.” (citations omitted) 
108 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2163 (citing district court, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1070, 
1071-1074. 
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rejected that.  It also rejected the NCAA’s own use of the term to 
defend a concept that had shifted over the time and in fact had no clear 
definition.  At the same time, however, the Court wrote a decision that 
was no broader than necessary to strike down rules in a way that 
permitted member schools to award limited compensation that 
certainly seems modest in comparison with professional salaries. 
 
 Absent intervention by Congress, this suggests either that the 
next shoe to drop will be any agreed-upon limitations whatsoever on 
student athlete compensation, or else a more stable and acceptable 
definition of amateur athletics and what kinds of limitations on 
competition that entails. 
 
 The antitrust laws are not an invitation to price regulation by 
another name.  An agreement limiting student athletes to, say, 
$100,000 would be just as unlawful under the Sherman Act as an 
agreement to deny them compensation altogether.  These problems 
emerged in the Court’s discussion of the lower court’s decree, 
developed below.109 
 
One approach would be for Congress to intervene, perhaps in 
the process defining the term “amateur” and proscribing reasonable 
limits on compensation and support.  Another might be to permit the 
NCAA to produce a more defensible and stable idea of amateurism.  
Unfortunately, that train may already have left the station. 
 
Compensation and Competitive Balance 
 The district court had rejected the NCAA’s argument that 
limitations on athlete compensation were essential to achieving 
“competitive balance among teams.”110 The NCAA did not pursue the 
argument on appeal. 
 “Balance” can mean a number of things.  The Supreme Court 
noted one particularly large imbalance, which was between student 
 
109 See discussion infra text at notes 110-30. 
110 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2152. 
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compensation and the multimillion dollar salaries paid to some NCAA 
coaches, athletic directors, and the president of the NCAA.111 
What the Court did not mention, however, was that the NCAA 
had attempted to cap the salaries of at least some coaches, but the Tenth 
Circuit had the salary rules under §1.112  As a result, member schools 
became liable for large treble damages awards.113  So the NCAA has 
been operating in a legal environment in which restraints on 
professional salaries were presumed to be unlawful.  The result has 
been bidding wars among the top sports schools, with salary 
differentials on the order of as much as eighty-to-one in various 
classifications of NCAA coaches.114 
What happened to coaching salaries in the wake of Law may 
be a predictor of what will happen to student athlete salaries in a 
market in which all NCAA-imposed caps are removed.  Only a small 
percentage of collegiate athletes go into professional leagues.  For 
example, in 2020 there were 73,712 NCAA football participants of 
whom 16,380 were deemed to be draft eligible.  Of these, 254 were 
actually drafted.  In basketball, 3669 out of 16,509 were draft eligible 
 
111 See id. at 2151. 
112 Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(Justice Gorsuch was not yet on the 10th Circuit at the time). 
113 After the decision, the parties settled for a damages award of 
$54,500,000.  See NCAA to Pay Coaches $54.5M, CBS NEWS (Mar. 9, 
1999, 6:32 PM),  https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ncaa-to-pay-coaches-
545m/.  
114 See Emily S. Sparvero & Stacy Warner, The Price of Winning and the 
Impact on the NCAA Community, 6 J. Intercollegiate Sport 120, 127 
(2013).  For example, as of 2011 salaries of Division I coaches ranged from 
a low of $23,950 to a high of $1,832,594.  Since then, a relatively small 
number of high paying NCAA coaches have earned salaries in the $5m to 
$9m range.  Nick Saban of the University of Alabama was at the top with a 
reported salary of $9.3 million.  See Scott Prather, 10 Highest Paid College 
Football Coaches in 2020, ESPN 1420 AM (Oct. 30, 2020), 
https://espn1420.com/10-highest-paid-college-football-coaches-in-2020/.   
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3879580
2021 Alston, Antitrust, and College Athletics 29 
 
but only 36 were drafted.115 Of course, many other might go to minor 
or foreign leagues, although at significantly smaller salaries.  But a 
very likely result will be that high offers will chase after a small 
number of superstar athletes, very likely going to schools with strong 
athletic reputations in a particular sport. 
 In sum, it does not necessarily follow that the fixing of 
maximum student compensation in Alston presents exactly the same 
problem as the fixing of stadium hot dog prices.  A stronger case can 
be made that student athlete compensation must be controlled in order 
to maintain competitive balance – a defense that is virtually universally 
rejected in the general run of cartel cases.  But athletic conferences are 
owned by universities that have a broader educational mission.  As a 
result, they may have an interest in maintaining broad participation in 
intercollegiate activities.116  For example, they regularly enforce such 
things as equalizing the number and size of scholarships that individual 
teams may offer.117 They select schools for particular “divisions” 
based on size and largely limit intercollegiate games to schools within 
a division, so that very large schools do not often play against very 
small ones.118  More generally, there is a well supported belief that 
intercollegiate sports is best served by a situation in which teams of 
roughly equal ability and resources play one another.119 In the Name 
 
115 See NCAA, Estimated Probability of Competing in Professional 
Athletics, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-
probability-competing-professional-athletics (Apr. 8, 2020). 
116 A wide literature has discussed the issue.  See E. Woodrow Eckard, The 
NCAA Cartel and Competitive Balance in College Football, 13 Rev. Indus. 
Org. 347 (1998) (finding that competitive balance has not improved 
notwithstanding NCAA efforts); Steven Salaga & Rodney Fort, Structural 
Change in Competitive Balance in Big-Time College Football, 50 Rev. 
Indus. Org. 27 (2017). 
117 See Daniel Sutter & Stephen Winkler, NCAA Scholarship Limits and 
Competitive Balance in College Football, 4 J. Sports Econ. 3 (2003). 
118 See Brian M. Mills & Steven Salaga, Historical Time Series Perspectives 
on Competitive Balance in NCAA Division I Basketball, 16 J. Sports Econ. 
614 (2015) 
119 See Allen R. Sanderson & John J. Siegfried, Thinking about Competitive 
Balance, 4 J. Sports Econ. 255 (2003). 
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and Likeness licensing antitrust litigation the district court denied 
summary judgment on the issue, although after expressing some 
doubts.120 
 In its 1984 decision the Supreme Court agreed that the NCAA 
had a legitimate role in maintaining competitive balance within NCAA 
football, but it also held that this did not serve to justify the challenged 
restraint on nationally televised games.121 In Alston the Supreme Court 
paid very little attention to the issue after noting that the district court 
had rejected it and observing that the NCAA did not appeal on that 
issue.122  The district court in the closely related O’Bannon case had 
also rejected it after concluding that the NCAA presented insufficient 
evidence on the issue.123 In particular, that court cited the lack of 
adequate evidence that concerns about competitive balance  affected 
desirability or audience size.124 Justice Kavanaugh also raised the issue 
briefly in his concurring opinion in Alston when discussing how the 
NCAA would operate in a regime in which all agreements governing 
athlete compensation were declared unlawful.125 
Counterintuitively, professional sports appear to differ.  In the 
American Needle case the Supreme Court recognized concerns for 
maintaining competitive balance as “legitimate and important” in the 
development of professional (NFL) football.126  And in Major League 
Baseball the Second Circuit found it to be an important interest to the 
 
120 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Student-Athlete Name & Likeness 
Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1149-1150 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
121 Bd. of Regents of U. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. at 117, 119-120 
122 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2153-54. 
123 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 955, 
1001-02 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
124 Id.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling in part, reaching 
the same conclusion about competitive balance.  O’Bannon v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir. 2015). 
125 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2168 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
126 Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 204 (2010) 
(“‘the interest in maintaining a competitive balance’ among ‘athletic teams 
is legitimate and important.’”).  
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preservation of professional baseball.127  In fact, the court in that case 
approved of a system in which revenues from the licensing of the 
intellectual property rights of the individual teams were pooled and 
distributed among them equally.128 
One wonders why the concern about competitive balance 
should be regarded as legitimate for professional sports but not for 
collegiate sports.  Intuitively, the opposite conclusion might seem 
more sensible.  For the future, more extensive fact finding on this issue 
would be helpful, including more elaborate articulation by the NCAA. 
The Alston Court did not disturb lower court findings that gave 
some credence to the argument that “professional-level cash payments 
. . . could . . . blur the distinction between college sports and 
professional sports and thereby negatively affect consumer 
demand.”129  The lower court had observed: 
[W]hen compared with having no limits on compensation, 
some of the challenged compensation rules may have an effect 
on preserving consumer demand for college sports as distinct 
from professional sports to the extent that they prevent 
unlimited cash payments unrelated to education such as those 
seen in professional sports leagues . . . . [H]owever, not all of 
the challenged rules in their current form are necessary to 
achieve this procompetitive effect, and there is a less restrictive 




127 Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 
328-329 (2d Cir. 2008). 
128 Id. at 334. 
129 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2153 (quoting the district court, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 
1104). 
130 Alston, 375 F.3d at 1101. 
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 The NCAA is a nonprofit organization comprised mainly, 
although not entirely,131 of nonprofit educational institutions.  Its 
principal job is not athletics but rather the education of students at an 
important transitional time in their lives.  In fact, the great majority of 
students who participate in NCAA athletics are not only amateurs at 
the time, but they will never become professional athletes.132 
 For its part, the Sherman Act pays no attention to the 
distinction between profit and non-profit institutions, although it pays 
a great deal of attention to the distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial acts.  That is, whether the Sherman Act applies 
depends on the nature of the restraint, not of the entities who are 
engaged in it.  This is not a consequence of any deep thought about the 
nature of nonprofit education but rather that the source of jurisdictional 
power for the Sherman Act is the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution, which applies only to “commerce.” 
 The distinction has actually served the educational community 
fairly well, because the division between “commercial” and 
“noncommercial” permits universities to do a great many things that 
are an important part of educational policy, although probably not of 
antitrust policy, such as guaranteeing that students athletes obtain a 
good education. 
 In Alston, the Court dismissed any claim that the NCAA and 
its members schools were not involved in a “commercial enterprise,” 
but rather “oversee[s] intercollegiate athletics ‘an an integral part of 
the undergraduate experience.’”133  Commercial status seems 
unquestionable in this case, as it was in the Board of Regents case, 
which involved lucrative television contracts. 
 
131 See Stephen L. Carter, What is a For-Profit College, Anyway? And Who 
Decides?, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 18, 2021, 10:30 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-03-18/what-is-a-for-
profit-college-anyway-and-who-decides.  
132 See discussion supra, text at note 115. 
133 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2158. 
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The statement should not be read to mean, however, that the 
Court regarded every conceivable regulation that the NCAA might 
impose as a commercial one.  Ordinarily the nature of the restraint, 
rather than of the organization, determines its commercial character.134  
As a result, nonprofit entities can be subjected to the antitrust laws, but 
their laws reach only “commercial” activities.135  To illustrate, suppose 
a student with low grades challenged the NCAA requirement that 
students must maintain a “C” average in order to participate in 
intercollegiate sports.136  Such a rule is literally output restricting, in 
the sense that some students otherwise able to play and perhaps even 
desirable for that purpose would be excluded.  To that extent it can 
even be said to “restrain trade.”  But the minimum GPA requirement 
is not a regulation of commerce, but rather of the school’s academic 
enterprise. 
On a related issue, the Court had no occasion to overrule 
baseball’s long-standing judicially created immunity from the antitrust 
laws.137 That immunity was also based on Justice Holmes’s conclusion 
in the early 1920s that baseball was not “commerce.”  In Alston, the 
Court appeared not to think very much of the baseball exemption but 
it noted that the route to overruling it was through Congress, and the 
same thing should apply to the present decisions concerning athlete 
compensation.  It noted that Congress had created antitrust immunities 
in the past,138 “[b]ut until Congress says otherwise, the only law it has 
asked us to enforce is the Sherman Act, and that law is predicated on 
 
134 See 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶¶ 260-262 (5th ed. 2020). 
135 See, e.g., Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women (NOW), 620 F.2d 1301 (8th 
Cir. 1980) (political boycott against states that did not ratify the Equal Rights 
Amendment not reachable under Sherman Act). 
136 See Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Atheltic Ass’n, No. 1:11-CV-0293, 2011 
WL 3878200 (S.D. Ind. Sep. 1, 2011) (noting NCAA’s minimum GPA 
requirement). 
137 See Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Pro. Baseball 
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); and 1B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra, note 
134, ¶ 251h2. 
138 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2159 (giving examples). 
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one assumption alone—“competition is the best method of allocating 
resources” in the Nation’s economy.”139 
Scope of the Decree 
 The Court was also concerned about administrability of the 
lower court’s decree, and the NCAA proffered some objections. The 
Court acknowledged that “static judicial decrees in ever-evolving 
markets may themselves facilitate collusion or frustrate entry and 
competition.”140  As a result “Judges must be open to reconsideration 
and modification of decrees in light of changing market realities,” 
because conditions may vary over time.141  Further, 
“An antitrust court is unlikely to be an effective day-to-day 
enforcer” of a detailed decree, able to keep pace with changing 
market dynamics alongside a busy docket.  Nor should any 
court “‘impose a duty . . . that it cannot explain or adequately 
and reasonably supervise.’” In short, judges make for poor 
“central planners” and should never aspire to the role.142 
 The Court more-or-less dismissed concerns raising the 
possibility that the NCAA would act in bad faith.  For example, the 
district court’s injunction permitting some post-eligibility internships 
could be circumvented by the use of different terminology.  It might 
permit a school to grant “a sneaker company or auto dealership” with 
“extravagant salaries” as a post-eligibility “internship.”  In any event 
the NCAA subsequent to the district court’s opinion had adopted new 
regulations that only a “conference or institution” may fund post-
eligibility internships. Further, the NCAA retained the ability to define 
appropriate educational benefits, thus “leaving . . . room to police 
phony internships.”143  It concluded that “. . . the NCAA may seek 
whatever limits on paid internships it thinks appropriate.144 
 
139 Id. at 2160 (citing Nat. Soc’y of Prof. Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 
679, 695 (1978)). 
140 Alston 141 S. Ct. at 2161 (citing Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offs. of 
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004)). 
141 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2163 (citing California Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 
781). 
142 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2163 (citing Trinko, 540 U. S. at 415, 408). 
143 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2164. 
144 Id. at 2165. 
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 The NCAA also attacked a part of the decree permitting 
schools to limit academic or graduation achievement awards, provided 
that those limits were “no lower than its aggregate limit on parallel 
athletic awards,” which were at the time $5980 per year.”145  The Court 
also noted that under the decree “the NCAA is free to forbid in-kind 
benefits unrelated to a student’s actual education; nothing stops it from 
enforcing a ‘no Lamborghini’ rule.”146  The Court then observed: 
To the extent the NCAA believes meaningful ambiguity really 
exists about the scope of its authority—regarding internships, 
academic awards, in-kind benefits, or anything else—it has 
been free to seek clarification from the district court since the 
court issued its injunction three years ago. The NCAA remains 
free to do so today. To date, the NCAA has sought clarification 
only once—about the precise amount at which it can cap 
academic awards—and the question was quickly resolved. 
Before conjuring hypothetical concerns in this Court, we 
believe it best for the NCAA to present any practically 
important question it has in district court first.147 
 
The Court also noted that the district court gave the NCAA 
“considerable leeway” even with respect to education-related benefits: 
 
[T]he court provided that the NCAA could develop its own 
definition of benefits that relate to education and seek 
modification of the court’s injunction to reflect that definition. 
The court explained that the NCAA and its members could 
agree on rules regulating how conferences and schools go 
about providing these education-related benefits. The court 
said that the NCAA and its members could continue fixing 
education-related cash awards, too—so long as those “limits 
are never lower than the limit” on awards for athletic 
performance. And the court emphasized that its injunction 
applies only to the NCAA and multiconference agreements; 
individual conferences remain free to reimpose every single 
enjoined restraint tomorrow—or more restrictive ones still.148 
 
145 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2165. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 2165-66. 
148 Id. at 2164 (citations to record omitted) 
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 The very last sentence of the quoted statement is peculiar, 
because the individual conferences within the NCAA also operate as 
agreements among the participating teams.  It is unclear why if a 
restraint covering the entire NCAA is unlawful, a restraint covering 
only the Big Ten or Pac-12 conference would be permissible, but the 
Court did not elaborate. 
The Court rejected a variety of objections to the decree.  
Nevertheless, it bears observing that all of the challenges were from 
the NCAA, arguing that the decree limited the NCAA’s control 
excessively.  The Court clarified that its focus was “only on the 
objections the NCAA” raised.”  It “express[ed] no views” on other 
issues.149  The Court did not categorically approve the restrictions on 
other compensation that might sometime be challenged by the players 
as too expansive.  It then closed with: 
Some will think the district court did not go far enough. 
By permitting colleges and universities to offer enhanced 
education-related benefits, its decision may encourage 
scholastic achievement and allow student-athletes a measure of 
compensation more consistent with the value they bring to their 
schools. Still, some will see this as a poor substitute for fuller 
relief. At the same time, others will think the district court went 
too far by undervaluing the social benefits associated with 
amateur athletics. For our part, though, we can only agree with 
the Ninth Circuit: “‘The national debate about amateurism in 
college sports is important. But our task as appellate judges is 
not to resolve it. Nor could we. Our task is simply to review the 
district court judgment through the appropriate lens of antitrust 
law.’”  That review persuades us the district court acted within 
the law's bounds.150 
 
Justice Kavanaugh alone concurred.  The principal point of his 
concurring opinion was to suggest that the NCAA’s remaining 
compensation rules might be unlawful under the Sherman Act as well, 
effectively leaving the compensation issue to the market.  Given the 
length that the Court’s opinion went to emphasize what the district 
 
149  Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2155. 
150 Id. at 2166 (quoting the Ninth Circuit, 958 F.3d at 1265). 
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court did not do, this decision reads a little more like a partial dissent 
rather than a concurrence.  He did emphasize that under the Court’s 
characterization comments about amateurism should be regarded as 
“stray” and not to be accorded much weight.  Indeed, he described 
them as “dicta” that “have no bearing on whether the NCAA’s current 
compensation rules are lawful.”151 Further, he believed that all the 
compensation limitations imposed by the NCAA should be subject to 
ordinary rule of reason analysis, and the Court had made clear that the 
NCAA is not entitled to an antitrust exemption.152 
From that point, Justice Kavanaugh found “serious questions 
whether the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules can pass muster 
under ordinary rule of reason scrutiny.”153  As he observed, “The 
NCAA’s business model would be flatly illegal in almost any other 
industry in America.”154 
Justice Kavanaugh also acknowledged the possibility of 
legislation as an alternative to antitrust litigation.155  Another 
possibility was collective bargaining which would presumably subject 
the issue to the labor immunity, which limits the application of the 
antitrust laws to much of professional sports.156  Somewhat 
mysteriously, he also suggested “some other negotiated agreement.”  
In general, however, an agreement that violated the Sherman Act 
would not be enforceable.  He did end, however, with this supplication 
in behalf of the athletes. 
 Nowhere else in America can businesses get away with 
agreeing not to pay their workers a fair market rate on the 
theory that their product is defined by not paying their workers 
a fair market rate. And under ordinary principles of antitrust 
law, it is not evident why college sports should be any different. 
The NCAA is not above the law.157 
 
151 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2167. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 2167. 
155 Id. at 2168 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
156 See 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶¶ 255-257 (5th ed. 2020). 
157 Id. at 2169 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
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Conclusion 
 The Court did not address every question about student athlete 
compensation.  It also made clear that it was not affirming every 
element of the district court’s decree.  One can anticipate future 
challenges from students claiming, as Justice Kavanaugh suggested, 
that all agreed-upon restrictions on student athlete compensation are 
unlawful.  But they will do so in the face of a unanimous decision that 
was sympathetic to the district court’s decree overall.  Even the 
Supreme Court’s dicta will be taken seriously. 
 That does not necessarily mean that Congressional intervention 
is unlikely or ill-advised. There is also good precedent for 
Congressional action.  For many years medical schools have run a 
“resident matching” program for recent graduates that assigns them by 
lottery to a particular employer for a residency.  That practice would 
almost certainly constitute market division, per se unlawful under the 
Sherman Act.  After a district court held just that, Congress passed 
legislation that immunized the practice from the antitrust laws.158  If 
Congressional action occurs in the NCAA situation, however, very 
likely more than student compensation will be on the table.  For 
example, Congress has already entertained proposals to limit the 




158 Confirmation of Antitrust Status of Graduate Medical Resident 
Matching Programs, 15 U.S.C. § 37b(b)(2).  See Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. 
Colls., 339 F. Supp. 2d 26, 34 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 184 Fed. Appx. 9 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1156 (2007), 
159 See Dennis Dodd, Proposed Federal Law Seeks to Limit Skyrocketing 
Salaries of College Coaches, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 28, 2020), 
https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/proposed-federal-law-
seeks-to-limit-skyrocketing-salaries-of-college-coaches/.  
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